To the Access to Information Officer, Fire Services Department
To the Access to Information Officer, Fire Services Department:
Pursuant to the Code on Access to Information, I would be grateful for the disclosure of the following on fire-safety monitoring arrangements for buildings during major maintenance works.
Context:
On 21 May 2026, a fatal fire occurred at Man Yuen Lau, Ferry Street, Jordan, resulting in 1 death and 4 injuries, with approximately 200 residents evacuated. The fire originated on the 13th floor, in a unit suspected to be a "one-into-nine" subdivided flat. At the time, the building was undergoing major maintenance works, with scaffolding and netting installed on the external walls; the works had been ongoing for nearly 2 years. Residents reported delayed fire-alarm activation, with some not hearing the alarm at all. In the same month, a charger-related fire occurred at Bayview Garden, Tsuen Wan (19 May 2026, 3 hospitalised), and an electrical short-circuit fire occurred at a temple in Wan Chai (20 May 2026). These events bear on construction-period fire safety, alarm system reliability, and subdivided-flat fire arrangements, but the related monitoring and statistical arrangements have not been systematically disclosed.
The information sought:
1. Fire-safety mechanism during major maintenance works:
(a) FSD's fire-impact assessment and guidelines for scaffolding/netting covering external walls during major maintenance;
(b) Fire-alarm system testing frequency, certification requirements, and inspection records during major maintenance;
(c) The FSD's current guidelines on fire arrangements during major maintenance works, and the date and key content of the most recent revision.
2. Fire-event cluster statistics and subdivided-flat fire safety:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, statistics of fire incidents categorised by cause (chargers, electrical short-circuit, scaffolding/netting, subdivided flats, etc.);
(b) Fire-incident statistics involving subdivided flats (including high-density "one-into-nine" partitioned units), fire-equipment configuration standards, and the cross-departmental inspection / referral mechanism with the Buildings Department / Home Affairs Department;
(c) Trend analysis, common-factor identification, and any early-warning mechanism for May 2026 fire incidents (including Man Yuen Lau, Bayview Garden, and the Wan Chai temple).
3. Fire-fleet and manpower resource adequacy:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, the fire-fleet size, number of vehicles by category, and manpower changes;
(b) Over the same period, total fire-incident numbers and growth trend, broken down by fire station / district;
(c) Average response-time attainment rate, and the principal reasons for non-attainment cases;
(d) Any FSD resource-gap assessment or manpower-needs estimate (if any) undertaken in response to recent changes in fire-incident volume.
Where any item involves criminal investigation, commercial sensitivities, or third-party privacy, partial redaction or anonymised aggregation would be acceptable.
Yours sincerely,
peter ng
Dear Mr NG,
Thank you for the email on the captioned dated 23.5.2026.
This serves as an interim reply that your request has received our
attention, and we shall get back to you as soon as possible.
Thank you.
Best regards,
Access to Information Officer
Fire Services Department
Disclaimers:
This e-mail message (together with any attachments) is for the designated
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From: [ATI #1584 email]
<[ATI #1584 email]>
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2026 12:48 AM
To: DO NL CS/FSD <[Fire Services Department request email]>
Subject: Access to Information request - To the Access to Information
Officer, Fire Services Department
To the Access to Information Officer, Fire Services Department:
Pursuant to the Code on Access to Information, I would be grateful for the
disclosure of the following on fire-safety monitoring arrangements for
buildings during major maintenance works.
Context:
On 21 May 2026, a fatal fire occurred at Man Yuen Lau, Ferry Street,
Jordan, resulting in 1 death and 4 injuries, with approximately 200
residents evacuated. The fire originated on the 13th floor, in a unit
suspected to be a "one-into-nine" subdivided flat. At the time, the
building was undergoing major maintenance works, with scaffolding and
netting installed on the external walls; the works had been ongoing for
nearly 2 years. Residents reported delayed fire-alarm activation, with
some not hearing the alarm at all. In the same month, a charger-related
fire occurred at Bayview Garden, Tsuen Wan (19 May 2026, 3 hospitalised),
and an electrical short-circuit fire occurred at a temple in Wan Chai (20
May 2026). These events bear on construction-period fire safety, alarm
system reliability, and subdivided-flat fire arrangements, but the related
monitoring and statistical arrangements have not been systematically
disclosed.
The information sought:
1. Fire-safety mechanism during major maintenance works:
(a) FSD's fire-impact assessment and guidelines for scaffolding/netting
covering external walls during major maintenance;
(b) Fire-alarm system testing frequency, certification requirements, and
inspection records during major maintenance;
(c) The FSD's current guidelines on fire arrangements during major
maintenance works, and the date and key content of the most recent
revision.
2. Fire-event cluster statistics and subdivided-flat fire safety:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, statistics of fire incidents
categorised by cause (chargers, electrical short-circuit,
scaffolding/netting, subdivided flats, etc.);
(b) Fire-incident statistics involving subdivided flats (including
high-density "one-into-nine" partitioned units), fire-equipment
configuration standards, and the cross-departmental inspection / referral
mechanism with the Buildings Department / Home Affairs Department;
(c) Trend analysis, common-factor identification, and any early-warning
mechanism for May 2026 fire incidents (including Man Yuen Lau, Bayview
Garden, and the Wan Chai temple).
3. Fire-fleet and manpower resource adequacy:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, the fire-fleet size, number
of vehicles by category, and manpower changes;
(b) Over the same period, total fire-incident numbers and growth trend,
broken down by fire station / district;
(c) Average response-time attainment rate, and the principal reasons for
non-attainment cases;
(d) Any FSD resource-gap assessment or manpower-needs estimate (if any)
undertaken in response to recent changes in fire-incident volume.
Where any item involves criminal investigation, commercial sensitivities,
or third-party privacy, partial redaction or anonymised aggregation would
be acceptable.
Yours sincerely,
peter ng
-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Dear Mr NG,
Please find our reply as follows -
1. Fire-safety mechanism during major maintenance works:
(a) FSD's fire-impact assessment and guidelines for scaffolding/netting
covering external walls during major maintenance;
Under the Fire Service (Installations and Equipment) Regulations (Cap.
95B), building owners are statutorily obliged to ensure that all fire
service installations and equipment (FSI) are maintained in efficient
working order at all times, and be inspected by a Registered Fire Service
Installation Contractor (RFSIC) at least once every 12 months. These
requirements remain fully applicable regardless of whether the building is
undergoing renovation works, including periods when major scaffolding and
protective netting are erected.
The Fire Services Department (FSD) has explicitly reminded all relevant
stakeholders, including building owners, RFSICs, and property management
practitioners, that it is of paramount importance to ensure all FSI are in
efficient working order prior to the commencement of major renovation
works, and that such status must be sustained throughout the entire
renovation period. In this connection, repair works relating to FSI should
not be carried out concurrently with major renovation activities, so as to
avoid any disruption to fire safety readiness.
To further enhance fire safety of buildings during large-scale renovation
and to address public concerns, the FSD has established a coordinated
notification and oversight framework with relevant departments, including
the Buildings Department, Architectural Services Department, Housing
Department, and the Independent Checking Unit of the Housing Bureau.
Under this arrangement, prior notification will be provided to the FSD
for fire safety inspections before extensive scaffoldings or protective
nets are erected, thereby facilitating timely assessment and intervention.
To strengthen supervision and enforcement of building FSIs, the FSD has
proactively implemented a special inspection and enforcement programme
titled “Operation Outpost” since January 2026. The programme aims to
inspect selected buildings through on-site functional tests on major FSIs
of buildings including those erecting major scaffoldings for large-scale
renovations, with particular attention to the functionality of fire alarm
systems, hose reel systems, and the fire service water tank levels.
During the first two months of “Operation Outpost”, a total of 1,500
buildings have been inspected. Where lack of annual FSI inspection or
defective FSI is identified, the FSD has taken, and will continue to take,
appropriate enforcement actions in accordance with relevant legislation.
“Operation Outpost” will continue for two more years, with an additional
5,000 targeted buildings to be inspected under the programme.
(b) Fire-alarm system testing frequency, certification requirements, and
inspection records during major maintenance;
Fire-alarm system testing frequency & certification requirements during
major maintenance
Under the Fire Service (Installations and Equipment) Regulations (Cap.
95B), building owners are statutorily obliged to ensure that all fire
service installations and equipment (FSI) are maintained in efficient
working order at all times, and be inspected by a Registered Fire Service
Installation Contractor (RFSIC) at least once every 12 months. These
requirements remain fully applicable regardless of whether the building is
undergoing renovation works, including periods when major scaffolding and
protective netting are erected.
The Fire Services Department (FSD) has explicitly reminded all relevant
stakeholders, including building owners, RFSICs, and property management
practitioners, that it is of paramount importance to ensure all FSI are in
efficient working order prior to the commencement of major renovation
works, and that such status must be sustained throughout the entire
renovation period. In this connection, repair works relating to FSI should
not be carried out concurrently with major renovation activities, so as to
avoid any disruption to fire safety readiness.
Inspection records during major maintenance
To strengthen supervision and enforcement of building FSIs, the FSD has
proactively implemented a special inspection and enforcement programme
titled “Operation Outpost” since January 2026. The programme aims to
inspect selected buildings through on-site functional tests on major FSIs
of buildings including those erecting major scaffoldings for large-scale
renovations, with particular attention to the functionality of fire alarm
systems, hose reel systems, and the fire service water tank levels.
During the first two months of “Operation Outpost”, a total of 1,500
buildings have been inspected. Where lack of annual FSI inspection or
defective FSI is identified, the FSD has taken, and will continue to take,
appropriate enforcement actions in accordance with relevant legislation.
“Operation Outpost” will continue for two more years, with an additional
5,000 targeted buildings to be inspected under the programme.
(c) The FSD's current guidelines on fire arrangements during major
maintenance works, and the date and key content of the most recent
revision.
The FSD has implemented a series of enhanced operational measures for
buildings undergoing major maintenance since 2026:
First, the FSD proactively conducts inspections of targeted buildings
under major maintenance to formulate site-specific contingency plans.
Second, additional firefighting resources are immediately dispatched to
any fire incidents occurring in such buildings.
Third, if adjacent buildings are also identified as undergoing major
maintenance, additional fire appliances are dispatched specifically to
monitor fire spread trends and initiate early evacuation procedures when
necessary.
2. Fire-event cluster statistics and subdivided-flat fire safety:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, statistics of fire incidents
categorised by cause (chargers, electrical short-circuit,
scaffolding/netting, subdivided flats, etc.);
According to information held by the FSD, statistics on fires classified
by cause are maintained for the period from 2023 to 2025. At present, the
FSD does not maintain statistics on fires classified by cause covering the
first quarter of 2026. The FSD does not maintain fire statistics
specifically categorised by “chargers”, “electrical short-circuit”,
“scaffolding/netting” or “subdivided flats” for the period from January
2021 to the present quarter.
The classification of fires by cause for the period from 2023 to 2025 is
set out below:
Classification of Fires by Causes 2023 2024 2025
Children playing with matches 3 2 4
Over-heating of engines, motor, & machinery 122 166 201
Food Stuff (stove overcooking) 1006 1058 1395
Careless handling or disposal of lighted materials, such
as cigarette ends, matches, joss sticks, joss papers and 781 791 723
candles, etc.
General electrical fault 1000 1014 1066
Miscellaneous 1622 1673 1602
False alarm 3248 3249 3608
Deliberate fires / Undetermined 534 518 458
Unwanted alarm 27787 29357 26915
Total 36103 37828 35972
(b) Fire-incident statistics involving subdivided flats (including
high-density "one-into-nine" partitioned units), fire-equipment
configuration standards, and the cross-departmental inspection / referral
mechanism with the Buildings Department / Home Affairs Department;
Fire-incident statistics involving subdivided flats
FSD does not maintain the relevant statistics of fires specifically
classified for subdivided flats.
Fire-equipment configuration standards
The requirements for Fire Service Installations and Equipment for Basic
Housing Units are set out in Chapter 4 of the Code of Practice on Minimum
Standards of Living Conditions for Basic Housing Units issued by the
Housing Bureau, which is available at
[1]https://www.bhu.gov.hk/forms/eng/CoP%20f....
Cross-departmental inspection / referral mechanism with BD / HAD
Under the current mechanism, any unauthorised building works, e.g.
subdivided units, identified by Fire Services Department personnel during
inspections will be referred to the relevant departments for follow-up
action.
(c) Trend analysis, common-factor identification, and any early-warning
mechanism for May 2026 fire incidents (including Man Yuen Lau, Bayview
Garden, and the Wan Chai temple).
The FSD does not maintain relevant records regarding the trend analysis,
common-factor identification, and early-warning mechanism for May 2026
fire incidents (including Man Yuen Lau, Bayview Garden, and the Wan Chai
temple).
3. Fire-fleet and manpower resource adequacy:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, the fire-fleet size, number
of vehicles by category, and manpower changes;
Types As at 31.12.2020 As at 31.3.2026
(a) Operational fire appliances: 655 741
(b) Ambulance vehicles: 485 566
(c) Total (a + b): 1,140 1,307
Establishment figures of uniformed staff: 10,417 10,348
(b) Over the same period, total fire-incident numbers and growth trend,
broken down by fire station / district;
According to our available records, the FSD maintains statistics on the
number of fires broken down by district for the period from 2023 to 2025.
At present, the FSD does not maintain statistics on the number of fires
broken down by district covering the first quarter of 2026. The FSD did
not maintain statistics on growth trends broken down by fire station for
the period from January 2021 to the present quarter.
The number of fires broken down by district in 2023 to 2025 is set out
below:
District 2023 2024 2025
CENTRAL AND WESTERN 2393 2506 2425
EASTERN 1980 2107 1926
ISLANDS 1670 1669 1558
KOWLOON CITY 2205 2430 2357
KWAI TSING 1969 2173 1888
KWUN TONG 2496 2572 2430
NORTH 1553 1752 1671
SAI KUNG 1662 1710 1680
SHA TIN 2319 2462 2303
SHAM SHUI PO 2230 2275 2118
SOUTHERN 1525 1493 1430
TAI PO 1235 1285 1271
TSUEN WAN 1551 1471 1333
TUEN MUN 1911 2268 2179
WAN CHAI 1960 1839 1732
WONG TAI SIN 1200 1334 1218
YAU TSIM MONG 3534 3588 3530
YUEN LONG 2672 2847 2888
Outside 18 District Boundary (e.g. Shenzhen Bay Port 38 47 35
Area)
Total 36103 37828 35972
(c) Average response-time attainment rate, and the principal reasons for
non-attainment cases;
Regarding graded response times of the FSD, building fire calls are
responded to within 6 minutes in built-up areas, and within 9 to 23
minutes in areas of dispersed risks and isolated developments. The target
is to achieve such response times in 92.5% and 94.5% of building fire
calls respectively.
The FSD maintains records in respect of fire services covering the period
from 2023 to 2025. At present, the FSD does not maintain such records
covering the first quarter of 2026.
The records in respect of fire services covering the period from 2023 to
2025 are set out below:
Targets 2023 2024 2025
Total building fire
calls met within graded 92.5 93.8 95.6 96.1
response time (%)
Fire calls met within
graded response time of 92.5 93.6 95.3 96
6 minutes for built-up
areas (%)
Fire calls met within
graded response time of
9 to 23 minutes for more 94.5 95.8 97.8 97.5
dispersed risk/isolated
developments (%)
The most frequent reason
for not meeting the / Traffic Delay Long Distance Traffic Delay
target
(d) Any FSD resource-gap assessment or manpower-needs estimate (if any)
undertaken in response to recent changes in fire-incident volume.
The FSD does not maintain records regarding resource gap assessments or
manpower-needs estimates specifically in response to recent changes in
fire-incident volumes.
Best regards,
Access to Information Officer
Fire Services Department
Disclaimers:
This e-mail message (together with any attachments) is for the designated
recipient only. It may contain information that is privileged for the
designated recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
hereby notified that any use, retention, disclosure, copying, printing,
forwarding or dissemination of the message is strictly prohibited. If you
have received the message in error, please erase all copies of the message
(including attachments) from your system and notify the sender
immediately.
本電郵(連同附加檔案)只供指定收件人閱讀，內容可能包括只有指定收件人才有權接
收的資料。如本電郵並非是發給你，你不得使用、保留、披露、複製、列印、轉發或
發放本電郵。如因錯誤致令你收到本電郵，請從你的電腦系統中刪除本電郵的所有複
本(包括附加檔案)，並立即通知發件人。
From: AccessIO/FSD/HKSARG
To: [ATI #1584 email]
Date: 01/06/2026 18:47
Subject: Re: Access to Information request - To the Access to
Information Officer, Fire Services Department
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Dear Mr NG,
Thank you for the email on the captioned dated 23.5.2026.
This serves as an interim reply that your request has received our
attention, and we shall get back to you as soon as possible.
Thank you.
Best regards,
Access to Information Officer
Fire Services Department
Disclaimers:
This e-mail message (together with any attachments) is for the designated
recipient only. It may contain information that is privileged for the
designated recipient. If you are not the intended recipient, you are
hereby notified that any use, retention, disclosure, copying, printing,
forwarding or dissemination of the message is strictly prohibited. If you
have received the message in error, please erase all copies of the message
(including attachments) from your system and notify the sender
immediately.
本電郵(連同附加檔案)只供指定收件人閱讀，內容可能包括只有指定收件人才有權接
收的資料。如本電郵並非是發給你，你不得使用、保留、披露、複製、列印、轉發或
發放本電郵。如因錯誤致令你收到本電郵，請從你的電腦系統中刪除本電郵的所有複
本(包括附加檔案)，並立即通知發件人。
From: [ATI #1584 email]
<[ATI #1584 email]>
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2026 12:48 AM
To: DO NL CS/FSD <[Fire Services Department request email]>
Subject: Access to Information request - To the Access to Information
Officer, Fire Services Department
To the Access to Information Officer, Fire Services Department:
Pursuant to the Code on Access to Information, I would be grateful for the
disclosure of the following on fire-safety monitoring arrangements for
buildings during major maintenance works.
Context:
On 21 May 2026, a fatal fire occurred at Man Yuen Lau, Ferry Street,
Jordan, resulting in 1 death and 4 injuries, with approximately 200
residents evacuated. The fire originated on the 13th floor, in a unit
suspected to be a "one-into-nine" subdivided flat. At the time, the
building was undergoing major maintenance works, with scaffolding and
netting installed on the external walls; the works had been ongoing for
nearly 2 years. Residents reported delayed fire-alarm activation, with
some not hearing the alarm at all. In the same month, a charger-related
fire occurred at Bayview Garden, Tsuen Wan (19 May 2026, 3 hospitalised),
and an electrical short-circuit fire occurred at a temple in Wan Chai (20
May 2026). These events bear on construction-period fire safety, alarm
system reliability, and subdivided-flat fire arrangements, but the related
monitoring and statistical arrangements have not been systematically
disclosed.
The information sought:
1. Fire-safety mechanism during major maintenance works:
(a) FSD's fire-impact assessment and guidelines for scaffolding/netting
covering external walls during major maintenance;
(b) Fire-alarm system testing frequency, certification requirements, and
inspection records during major maintenance;
(c) The FSD's current guidelines on fire arrangements during major
maintenance works, and the date and key content of the most recent
revision.
2. Fire-event cluster statistics and subdivided-flat fire safety:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, statistics of fire incidents
categorised by cause (chargers, electrical short-circuit,
scaffolding/netting, subdivided flats, etc.);
(b) Fire-incident statistics involving subdivided flats (including
high-density "one-into-nine" partitioned units), fire-equipment
configuration standards, and the cross-departmental inspection / referral
mechanism with the Buildings Department / Home Affairs Department;
(c) Trend analysis, common-factor identification, and any early-warning
mechanism for May 2026 fire incidents (including Man Yuen Lau, Bayview
Garden, and the Wan Chai temple).
3. Fire-fleet and manpower resource adequacy:
(a) From January 2021 to the present quarter, the fire-fleet size, number
of vehicles by category, and manpower changes;
(b) Over the same period, total fire-incident numbers and growth trend,
broken down by fire station / district;
(c) Average response-time attainment rate, and the principal reasons for
non-attainment cases;
(d) Any FSD resource-gap assessment or manpower-needs estimate (if any)
undertaken in response to recent changes in fire-incident volume.
Where any item involves criminal investigation, commercial sensitivities,
or third-party privacy, partial redaction or anonymised aggregation would
be acceptable.
Yours sincerely,
peter ng
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Please use this email address for all replies to this request:
[ATI #1584 email]
Is [Fire Services Department request email] the wrong address for Access to Information
requests to Fire Services Department? If so, please contact us using this
form:
[2]https://accessinfo.hk/change_request/new...
Disclaimer: This message and any reply that you make will be published on
the internet. Our privacy and copyright policies:
[3]https://accessinfo.hk/help/officers
If you find this service useful as an ATI officer, please ask your web
manager to link to us from your organisation's ATI page.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
References
Visible links
1. https://www.bhu.gov.hk/forms/eng/CoP%20f...
2. https://accessinfo.hk/change_request/new...
3. https://accessinfo.hk/help/officers